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DOMESTIC LAW
I. COURT REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL
SEPARATION
In Ariail v. Ariail1 the South Carolina Court of Appeals addressed
the issue of whether a cause of action for legal separation exists in
South Carolina.2 This issue has been a source of confusion in this state
for two reasons. First, both family courts and the supreme court have
used interchangeably separate terms to designate various types of di-
vorce proceedings, often substituting one term for another when they
do not mean the same thing.' Second, once legal separation has been
identified as an issue, courts have not clearly addressed its validity in
South Carolina.4 The court in Ariail held that since there is no consti-
tutional or statutory provision for legal separation in this state, no ac-
tion can be maintained for such a proceeding.5
Mrs. Ariail appealed an order of the family court judge, who re-
fused to grant her a legal separation, child custody, child support, and
attorney's fees. At the time of the trial, Mr. and Mrs. Arial lived to-
gether in the marital home. Mrs. Ariail suggested that she remained
there only for the sake of the couple's two minor children. The court of
appeals affirmed in part the family court order.
Mrs. Arial subsequently petitioned the court for rehearing. She
contended that her action should have been treated as one for separate
maintenance, rather than one for legal separation, because the parties
had treated the action as one for separate maintenance. The court re-
jected this contention because the record "clearly refiect[ed] the action
was for a different purpose."' It reasoned that an action for separate
maintenance was the same as an action for alimony.7 Since Mrs. Arial
had withdrawn her request for alimony, her remaining requests consti-
1. 295 S.C. 486, 369 S.E.2d 146 (Ct. App.), reh'g denied, 295 S.C. 486, 490, 369
S.E.2d 146, 148 (Ct. App. 1988).
2. Legal separation is sometimes called divorce from bed and board, divorce a
mensa et thoro, or limited divorce. Nocher v. Nocher, 268 S.C. 503, 508, 234 S.E.2d 884,
886 (1977).
3. See id.
4. See Murray v. Murray, 271 S.C. 62, 244 S.E.2d 538 (1978) (affirming order of
family court granting legal separation without addressing validity of cause of action).
5. Ariail, 295 S.C. at 489, 369 S.E.2d at 148.
6. Id. at 491, 369 S.E.2d at 149 (order on petition for rehearing).
7. See id.
1
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tuted a cause of action for legal separation.' The court clearly ex-
plained that South Carolina does not recognize a cause of action for
legal separation. Thus, the petition for rehearing was denied.9
The court based its decision on the fact that it found no constitu-
tional or statutory authority allowing legal separation, or divorce a
mensa et thoro,10 in this state.1 It briefly discussed three South Caro-
lina Code sections,' 2 concluding that there is no provision stating the
grounds for a limited divorce.' 3 Without such a provision, the court
found that "'the cause of action could not be created.' "i The court
compared the legal theories of separate maintenance, which is viable in
this state, and legal separation, which is not.'" It cited several earlier
cases that distinguished the two causes of action,"6 but offered no com-
ment as to how the two causes differ. Nonetheless, the fact that there
is a clearly defined difference between legal separation and separate
maintenance seems well settled.
17
The Ariail court, in deciding whether there exists in this state a
cause of action for legal separation, devoted a sizeable portion of its
8. Id.
9. Id. at 493, 369 S.E.2d at 150.
10. See supra note 2.
11. Ariail, 295 S.C. at 488, 369 S.E.2d at 147.
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-140 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1988) (allowing for ali-
mony and suit money in marital litigation); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(2) (Law. Co-op.
1976 & Supp. 1988) (conferring jurisdiction upon the family court to hear and determine
actions for legal separation); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-1020(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (re-
pealed 1981) (conferring upon the family court all the power and authority and jurisdic-
tion by law rested in the circuit courts in actions for divorce a vinculo matrimonii and a
mensa et thoro).
13. Ariail, 295 S.C. at 488, 369 S.E.2d at 147.
14. Id. at 489, 369 S.E.2d at 148 (quoting Nocher v. Nocher, 268 S.C. 503, 510, 234
S.E.2d 884, 887 (1977)).
15. See id. at 488, 369 S.E.2d at 147.
16. See id. (citing Nocher, 268 S.C. 503, 234 S.E.2d 884; McChesney v. McChesney,
91 N.J. Super. 523, 221 A.2d 557 (Ch. Div. 1966); Fisher v. Harrison, 165 Va. 323, 182
S.E. 543 (1935)).
17. See, e.g., Lavino v. Lavino, 23 N.J. 635, 130 A.2d 369 (1957). The New Jersey
Supreme Court explained that the legal effect of a decree of separate maintenance is
much the same as that of a limited divorce because in neither is the marital bond dis-
solved. The New Jersey court stated:
The primary purpose in obtaining a limited divorce is to nullify the marital
obligations of cohabitation; the primary object of separate maintenance is to
enforce the husband's duty of support .... The statutory philosophy of sepa-
rate maintenance is to favor a resumption of cohabitation .... Limited di-
vorce forbids it .... [Therefore] the marital bond, though not dissolved is
considerably more disrupted by limited divorce than by a decree of separate
maintenance.
Id. at 639-40, 130 A.2d at 371; see also 24 Am. Jua. 2D Divorce and Separation § 3 (1983)
(defining the difference between the two terms).
[Vol. 41
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opinion to the discussion of relevant statutes. This discussion is rather
cloudy, however, and does not actually tell why the cited sections do
not provide a cause of action for legal separation; it merely states that
they do not. The court indicated, however, that its decision was based
largely on the fact that, although the statutes expressly mention legal
separation, they do not provide the grounds necessary for it.18 The
court could have been clearer by citing the concurring opinion in
Brewer v. Brewer,19 in which Justice Bussey stated that "no remedy is
complete without a definition of the cases to which it shall extend, and
a mere grant of judicial power even in the Constitution [does] not,
without more, create a cause of action."2
An obvious hurdle for the court in Ariail was the supreme court's
decision in Murray v. Murray.2 In Murray the supreme court affirmed
a family court order granting legal separation, but did not address the
validity of the cause of action. Although the Ariail court cited Murray,
it virtually ignored the result in the case. Instead, it chose to follow
Nocher v. Nocher,22 in which the court refused to grant a legal separa-
tion in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority. While the
court in Ariail did not even mention the issue in Murray, its decision
to follow Nocher was a prudent one.
A possible explanation for the two obviously conflicting results in
Murray and Nocher is that the supreme court in Murray simply failed
to take note of its earlier ruling in Nocher. A more plausible explana-
tion, however, is that when deciding the two cases the court was not
careful with its terminology. Thus, it is likely that the court termed
what should have been an action for separate maintenance an action
for legal separation instead.
In her petition for rehearing, Mrs. Ariail cited Brewington v.
Brewington,23 a court of appeals decision, for the proposition that the
courts of this state have jurisdiction to grant a legal separation.24 The
court retorted, "We did not hold in Brewington, as Mrs. Ariail seems
to suggest, that a family court has the power to award a legal separa-
tion or limited divorce in the absence of a statute or constitutional pro-
vision."2 5 The Ariail court's strong denial of Mrs. Ariail's assertion may
not be as well founded as the court suggests, however. Indeed, it may
be an effort by the court to avoid having to harmonize the Ariail deci-
18. See Ariail, 295 S.C. at 488-89, 369 S.E.2d at 147.
19. 242 S.C. 9, 129 S.E.2d 736 (1963).
20. Id. at 24-25, 129 S.E.2d at 744 (Bussey, J., concurring).
21. 271 S.C. 62, 244 S.E.2d 538 (1978).
22. 268 S.C. 503, 234 S.E.2d 884 (1977).
23. 280 S.C. 502, 313 S.E.2d 53 (Ct. App. 1984).
24. See Ariail, 295 S.C. at 492, 369 S.E.2d at 149 (order on petition for rehearing).
25. Id. at 493, 369 S.E.2d at 149.
1989]
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sion with what seems to be a contradictory opinion, decided just four
years earlier. The court of appeals in Brewington stated:'
The trial court granted the wife a legal separation ....
The issues presented on appeal are: (1) whether a spouse may
bring an action for a legal separation ... ; (2) whether the evidence
was sufficient to determine an equitable distribution of the marital
property. . . .We affirm the trial court on all issues except the issue
involving an equitable distribution of the marital property.26
Based on this language from Brewington, it seems Mrs. Ariail's as-
sertion was well founded. As noted, however, the court quickly dis-
missed the assertion without explaining its variance from the decision
in Brewington. If the court was not able to distinguish or explain the
conflict presented by Murray and Brewington, it should have acknowl-
edged the precedent set by the cases and granted Mrs. Ariail's request
for legal separation.
A study of the case law from other jurisdictions shows that other
states recognize legal separation as a cause of action. Alabama, Louisi-
ana, Missouri, and North Carolina all permit legal separation. 7 Flor-
ida, on the other hand, does not permit it.28 The Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act,29 the model no-fault-divorce statute, has been
adopted in Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, and Montana.30 It
provides that if a party requests a decree of legal separation rather
than a decree of dissolution of marriage, the court must grant the de-
cree unless the other party objects. 31
Given the dichotomy between states that recognize a cause of ac-
tion for legal separation and those that do not, one is prompted to
inquire as to the basis on which states are making this decision. Why
are courts so often reluctant to grant a legal separation? Mr. Justice
Bussey, in his concurring opinion in Brewer, provided some insight
into South Carolina's reasons for refusing to do so. He stated, "The
nature of a divorce a mensa et thoro being more drastic, and complete
or final, we should not by judicial implication contribute to the recog-
nition of such a cause of action in the absence of legislation setting
26. Brewington, 280 S.C. at 504, 313 S.E.2d at 54.
27. See Drummond v. Drummond, 466 So. 2d 974 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985); Wright v.
Wright, 407 So. 2d 1298 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Whiteley v. Whiteley, 490 So. 2d 1128 (La.
Ct. App. 1986); Frerichs v. Frerichs, 704 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Howell v. Tun-
stall, 64 N.C. App. 703, 308 S.E.2d 454 (1983).
28. See Hilderbran v. Hilderbran, 357 So. 2d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (stating
that a limited divorce, a mensa et thoro, is still recognized in some states, but not in
Florida).
29. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Aar §§ 101-506, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1973).
30. 2 SHEPARD'S ACTS AND CASES BY PoPuLAR NAMaES 1257 (3d ed. 1986).
31. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 302(b), 9A U.L.A. at 181 (1973).
[Vol. 41
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forth the grounds therefor and the consequences thereof."32 Thus,
South Carolina apparently favors a resumption of cohabitation, which
is possible through an action for separate maintenance.3
By holding that legal separation and separate maintenance are two
different things, and that the former is not a recognized cause of action
in South Carolina, the Ariail court made an effort to clarify this state's
position on the issue. The result of this case, then, forces one to con-
sider the lack of alternatives available to one who no longer feels com-
fortable in one's marriage, but who does not have the means by which
to support oneself.
After Ariail v. Ariail, family courts recognizing a need for legal
separation are powerless to grant it, despite the wishes of the parties.
The legislature should remedy the potential inequities of this result by
enacting statutory provisions stating grounds on which actions for legal
separation could be brought.3 4 If the legislature does not wish to pro-
vide such a cause of action, it should enact a statutory provision mak-
ing that clear.35 In the meantime, the state of the law in South Caro-
lina is that parties who wish to dissolve their spousal obligations, but
cannot afford to leave the marital home, or who choose to stay for the
sake of their children, will be granted no relief.
Laura E. Zoole
II. COURT STRICTLY CONSTRUES STATUTE BARRING ALIMONY TO
ADULTEROUS SPOUSE
In Spires v. Spires6 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held an
adulterous spouse cannot raise recrimination as a defense to the stat-
utory bar to alimony.38 This case of first impression in South Carolina
32. Brewer v. Brewer, 242 S.C. 9, 26, 129 S.E.2d 736, 745 (1963) (Bussey, J.,
concurring).
33. See Lavino v. Lavino, 23 N.J. 635, 639-40, 130 A.2d 369, 371 (1957) (noting the
statutory philosophy of separate maintenance is to favor a resumption of cohabitation).
34. The Alabama State Legislature has enacted such a statute, which could serve
as a model for a similar South Carolina law. See ALA. CODE § 30-2-30 (1975).
35. The Florida State Legislature has enacted a statute which provides that no
divorce is from bed and board, but is from the bonds of matrimony. See FLA. STAT. §
61.031 (1984).
36. 296 S.C. 422, 373 S.E.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1988).
37. Recrimination is defined as "[a] charge made by an accused person against the
accuser; in particular a counter-charge of adultery or cruelty made by one charged with
the same offense in a suit for divorce, against the person who has charged him or her."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1147 (5th ed. 1979).
38. South Carolina Code section 20-3-130 creates the bar to alimony to an adulter-
ous spouse. The statute reads:
19891
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arose when Charles Quitman Spires commenced an action for divorce
on the ground of adultery. Mr. Spires sought to discontinue alimony
awarded to Mrs. Spires by an earlier order of the court based on her
alleged adulterous conduct. The wife denied the allegations and filed a
counterclaim for divorce on the ground of adultery, or in the alterna-
tive, for divorce based on one year's continuous separation. Mrs. Spires
also plead recrimination as a defense both to her husband's cause of
action for divorce and to his request that alimony be barred. 9
The family court judge found both parties had proved their re-
spective cases for adultery, and thus that Mrs. Spires had established
her defense of recrimination.'0 As a result, the family court judge de-
nied divorce on the ground of adultery, but granted it based on one
year's continuous separation."' The judge found, however, that while
recrimination is a defense to an action for divorce, it is not a defense to
the application of South Carolina Code section 20-3-130,"' which bars
alimony to an adulterous spouse.'3 Accordingly, the family court judge
denied Mrs. Spires' request to have alimony continued,44 and the court
of appeals affirmed.'9
The court readily decided the appealed issue by focusing on the
part of the statute that reads, "No alimony shall be granted an adul-
terous spouse.1 46 The court apparently believed there was no room for
interpretation with regard to the language, and thus strictly construed
the statute to disallow recrimination as an exception to section 20-3-
130.47
The issue decided in Spires raises two important questions. First,
how can Spires be reconciled with Oyler v. Oyler, 4 an earlier court of
In every judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony the court shall
make such orders touching the maintenance, alimony and suit money of either
party or any allowance to be made to him or her and, if any, the security to be
given as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case may
be just. No alimony shall be granted an adulterous spouse. In any award of
permanent alimony the court shall have jurisdiction to order periodic pay-
ments or payment in a lump sum.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
39. Record at 1.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Law. Co-op. 1976), see supra note 38.
43. Spires, 296 S.C. at 423, 373 S.E.2d at 699.
44. Mrs. Spires requested continuation of alimony awarded by the court in its or-
der dated November 6, 1986, but the judge refused the request based on South Carolina
Code section 20-3-130. See Record at 1.
45. Spires, 296 S.C. at 423 , 373 S.E.2d at 699.
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
47. See Spires, 296 S.C. at 423, 373 S.E.2d at 699.
48. 293 S.C. 4, 358 S.E.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1987).
[Vol. 41
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appeals case clearly implying recrimination could constitute an excep-
tion to the bar to alimony for an adulterous spouse? And second, does
Spires mean an adulterous spouse will never be granted alimony?
In Oyler the court of appeals was presented with a case in which
the husband, who raised the issue of adultery for the first time at trial,
sought to bar his wife's claim to alimony. The court found adultery to
constitute an avoidance to an action for alimony, and as such required
it to be plead under the South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)."9
Since the husband had not plead adultery, the court of appeals re-
versed the family court judge and disallowed the testimony concerning
the wife's infidelity." In support of its reversal, the court stated that
"[h]ad the wife in this case been on notice that the husband would
raise adultery as a bar to her alimony claim, she could have plead and
sought to prove recrimination . .. .51
The language from Oyler, however, did not persuade the court in
Spires. In fact, Mrs. Spires' argument on appeal was based largely on
the Oyler decision,52 yet the Spires court never acknowledged the lan-
guage in Oyler. Presumably, the court considered the language in Oyler
merely non-binding dicta, and thus felt no obligation to either ex-
pressly overrule or distinguish the case . 3
Irrespective of the reason, the important point of which the practi-
tioner should be aware is that the court's failure to reference Oyler in
the Spires opinion was neither an oversight nor a license to continue to
rely on the recrimination language in Oyler. The court of appeals is
keenly aware of the Oyler language and, in light of its finding that sec-
tion 20-3-130 is clear and unambiguous, the court has chosen to ignore
it. Simply stated, reliance on Oyler, as support for the proposition that
recrimination is a defense to the statutory bar to alimony, is no longer
justifiable after Spires.
The court's conclusion in Spires clearly is based on the sound rule
of strict construction.5 4 Prior to Spires, however, the rule had not been
49. Id. at 7, 358 S.E.2d at 172. The court stated that "[t]he purpose of Rule 8(c) is
to avoid the 'surprise' defenses permissible under the old general denial answer, and
require the defendant to stick to 'fact' pleading." Id. at 7-8, 358 S.E.2d at 172 (citing S.C.
R. Civ. P. 8(c) reporter's note).
50. Id. at 8, 358 S.E.2d at 172.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. See Brief of Appellant at 1.
53. This presumption is based on the fact that the Spires court ruled in favor of
the Respondent and it was the Respondents position that the pertinent language from
Oyler was merely "unsupported dicta." See Brief of Respondent at 6.
54. See Spires, 296 S.C. at 423, 373 S.E.2d at 699. The court stated, "Where a
statute is clear and unambiguous, there is not room for construction, and, the terms of
the statute must be given their literal meaning." Id. (citing Duke Power Co. v. South
Carolina Tax Comm'n, 292 S.C. 64, 354 S.E.2d 902 (1987)).
1989]
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applied to South Carolina Code section 20-3-130. In fact, in several
cases both the court of appeals and the South Carolina Supreme Court
have refused to strictly construe the statute and have allowed alimony
to an adulterous spouse.
In Grubbs v. Grubbs5" the supreme court reversed a family court
judge who apparently applied the rule of strict construction to bar ali-
mony to a wife who admitted committing adultery eleven years prior to
the divorce action. The court based its reversal on the doctrine of con-
donation, stating, "While Mrs. Grubbs admitted committing a single
indiscretion in 1966, this should not prevent her from receiving ali-
mony. . . . [T]he preponderance of the evidence indicates [Mr.
Grubbs] condoned her isolated act of infidelity.""6 Thus, in Grubbs the
supreme court clearly was willing to allow an admitted adulterous
spouse to receive alimony notwithstanding the statute, which, strictly
construed, would have barred the award.
Similarly, the supreme court allowed alimony to an adulterous
spouse in Sattler v. Sattler,57 in which separated spouses entered into
a "Complete Support, Custody and Property Settlement" which gave
the wife monthly payments of unallocated support. The agreement
provided it could not be altered except by written agreement between
the parties. Subsequent to execution of the agreement, however, the
wife was found guilty of adultery and was denied alimony under sec-
tion 20-3-130. The supreme court refused to affirm the family court's
strict construction of the statute, holding that "the terms of the agree-
ment . . . control[led], rather than the terms of Section 20-3-130."I'
The supreme court also permitted an award of alimony in Smoak
v. Smoak."' In that case the court held a husband estopped from prov-
ing adultery by asserting the invalidity of a Haitian divorce that he
had procured and had long represented to his wife as valid. The court
focused on and quoted the same language as the court in Spires, but
did not regard the language of the statute as conclusive.60 Instead, the
supreme court refused to allow the statute to. work an injustice, saying
that "the rule of estoppel had closed his mouth to assert that which he
would attempt to prove."'"
The court of appeals also has shown a willingness to allow alimony
to an adulterous spouse. Prior to its finding in Spires that the language
of section 20-3-130 was "clear and unambiguous," the court twice per-
55. 272 S.C. 138, 249 S.E.2d 747 (1978).
56. Id. at 140, 249 S.E.2d at 748-49.
57. 284 S.C. 422, 327 S.E.2d 71 (1985).
58. Id. at 424, 327 S.E.2d at 72.
59. 269 S.C. 313, 237 S.E.2d 372 (1977).
60. See id. at 317, 321, 237 S.E.2d at 373, 375.
61. Id. at 321, 237 S.E.2d at 375.
[Vol. 41
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mitted alimony when the award was questionable at best.
As previously discussed, the court in Oyler refused to bar alimony
to an adulterous wife because the husband failed to raise the issue in
his pleadings. Additionally, the court in Doe v. Doe,62 faced with decid-
ing whether an act of fellatio constituted adultery for the purpose of
section 20-3-130, held the act "was condoned by the husband so that
even if [it] was an act of adultery, the husband [could not] avail him-
self of it as a bar to paying the wife alimony." 3
Thus, while the rule of strict construction, on which Spires is
based, is itself a sound basis for the decision, in actuality the rule
seems somewhat out of place when applied to section 20-3-130, which
has so often been construed liberally to avoid inequitable results. Both
the supreme court and the court of appeals have demonstrated a num-
ber of exceptional circumstances under which they will refuse to
strictly construe the statute and will allow alimony to an adulterous
spouse. Consequently, the rule of Spires is one of limited scope and,
therefore, practitioners should be aware that contrary to the apparent
rule from the case, it is possible for an adulterous spouse to be granted
alimony.
Steven A. McKelvey, Jr.
III. FAMILY COURT MAY NOT CONSIDER FACT THAT ADULTEROUS
SPOUSE IS BARRED FROM ALIMONY WHEN MAKING EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
The South Carolina Supreme Court recently held that the statu-
tory preclusion of alimony to an adulterous spouse may not be consid-
ered to increase that spouse's equitable distribution award. In Berry v.
Berry'" the court allowed public policy considerations manifested in
the statute barring alimony to override other factors relevant to the
equitable division of marital property.
William Berry, Jr. and Patricia Berry were divorced after thirty
years of marriage. William Berry initiated the action, alleging adultery
and requesting an equitable division of marital property. Patricia
Berry admitted adultery and counterclaimed for equitable division of
marital property, alimony, and attorney's fees. The trial court granted
William Berry the divorce, equitably divided the marital estate, and
barred Patricia Berry from receiving alimony and attorney's fees. Mr.
62. 286 S.C. 507, 334 S.E.2d 829 (Ct. App. 1985).
63. Id. at 512, 334 S.E.2d at 832.
64. 294 S.C. 334, 364 S.E.2d 463 (1988).
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Berry appealed the family court decree, asserting, inter alia, that the
judge erroneously awarded the wife more than her equitable portion of
the marital property because he was precluded from awarding the
adulterous spouse alimony. The court of appeals agreed with Mr.
Berry's assertion and reversed and remanded the equitable division
award.65 Patricia Berry petitioned the supreme court for certiorari. The
court granted certiorari and affirmed the court of appeals' decision that
a family court may not consider the fact that a spouse is barred from
alimony in making an equitable distribution of marital property."6
The supreme court reasoned that the court of appeals' decision
prohibits the family court from using equitable division of marital
property to avoid the mandate of South Carolina Code section 20-3-
130,67 which bars alimony to an adulterous spouse.68 The petitioner ar-
gued that the court of appeals' decision ignored the following two fac-
tors enumerated by the supreme court to be considered when equitably
dividing marital property: "(1) the present income of the parties; and
(2) the effect of distribution of assets on the ability to pay alimony and
support."6 9 The supreme court rejected this argument and held that
"the preclusion of an alimony award to a spouse cannot be used to
increase an equitable distribution award. '70 The court indicated that
its decision was based at least in part on the fact that public policy
considerations compel this result.
71
The court of appeals based its holding on the rule that fault may
be used to decrease an award of equitably distributed property, but
never to increase it.7 2 It also focused on public policy considerations of
the alimony barring statutes. 73 The supreme court's rationale was con-
sistent with that of the court of appeals. The supreme court stated that
a family court may consider a party's income and the effect of distribu-
tion of property on the party's ability to pay alimony and support
when a divorce has been granted on grounds of adultery.74 A preclusion
of alimony, however, may not be used to increase an equitable distribu-
65. Berry v. Berry, 290 S.C. 351, 356, 350 S.E.2d 398, 401 (Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 294
S.C. 334, 364 S.E.2d 463 (1988).
66. Berry, 294 S.C. at 334, 364 S.E.2d at 463.
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
68. See Berry, 294 S.C. at 335, 364 S.E.2d at 463-64.
69. Id., 364 S.E.2d at 464 (citing Shaluly v. Shaluly, 284 S.C. 71, 325 S.E.2d 66
(1985)).
70. Id.
71. See id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
72. See Berry v. Berry, 290 S.C. 351, 356, 350 S.E.2d 398, 401 (Ct. App. 1986),
afj'd, 294 S.C. 334, 364 S.E.2d 463 (1988).
73. Id.
74. Berry, 294 S.C. at 335, 364 S.E.2d at 464.
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Public policy considerations supporting the court's reasoning are
subject to criticism. Both statutory 6 and supreme court" standards
use alimony as a factor in the allocation of assets. If no alimony is
awarded, arguably the adulterous spouse should get more assets in lieu
of alimony. Since the purpose of alimony is to place a supported
spouse in a position of support comparable to that enjoyed during the
marriages7 8 it seems logically inconsistent to deny support on the basis
of adultery. Difficulty arises, however, in determining how much more
should be awarded since the fault of the adulterous spouse must be
taken into account.
A bill pending in the legislature would delete the statutory provi-
sion that prohibits alimony awards to adulterous spouses.79 Currently,
policies that penalize the adulterous spouse conflict with policies that
provide for spousal support.8 0 The supreme court viewed the public
policy considerations that condemn adultery to be of the utmost im-
portance in balancing awards of alimony and equitable distribution of
marital property. Thus, consistent with South Carolina Code sections
20-3-13081 and 20-7-472,12 the Berry court refused alimony to the adul-
terous spouse and read into the statutes the policy that an equitable
distribution award may not be increased to compensate for the preclu-
sion of alimony to a spouse who has committed adultery.
The precedent established by the court in Berry will result in
closer scrutiny of equitable distribution of marital property when an
adulterous spouse is involved. It is also likely that the case will lead to
often unwarranted smaller distributions to adulterous spouses. None-
theless, both the court of appeals and the supreme court have ruled,
and unless and until the legislature enacts the proposed amendment
that would remove the bar to alimony to an adulterous spouse, family
courts may not consider the fact that a spouse is barred from alimony
75. Id.
76. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-472(9) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
77. See Smith v. Smith, 294 S.C. 194, 202, 363 S.E.2d 404, 408 (Ct. App. 1987).
78. Johnson v. Johnson, 296 S.C. 289, 300, 372 S.E.2d 107, 113 (Ct. App. 1988),
cert. denied, - S.C. -, 378 S.E.2d 445 (1989).
79. H.R. 3121, 108th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (S.C. 1988) (proposed amendment to S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Law. Co-op. 1976)). This bill was introduced in 1989, but was not
acted upon. The bill's statute remains the same for the 1990 session of the General As-
sembly and could be passed in 1990 without reintroduction.
80. See Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566 (1978) (property settlement
can be alternate method of satisfying alimony award, but property transfer cannot be
ordered in lieu of alimony).
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
82. Id. § 20-7-472 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
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when making an equitable distribution of marital property.
Johanna Searle
IV. COURT OF APPEALS MOVING TOWARD INCLUSION OF MILITARY AND
CIVILIAN PENSIONS AS MARITAL PROPERTY SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION
With over 67,000 military and civilian personnel stationed in
South Carolina, 3 the treatment of military and civil service pensions
in divorce proceedings is an issue of considerable consequence. The
disposition of these pensions, however, is an unsettled issue in South
Carolina. This survey article focuses primarily on military and civil ser-
vice pensions, but many of the issues addressed are relevant to other
types of pensions as well.
In Walker v. Walker, 4 a divorce proceeding, the South Carolina
Court of Appeals considered whether a military pension should be in-
cluded in the marital estate and thus be subject to equitable appor-
tionment. The court declined to rule on the issue, holding the wife had
made no contributions to the marital estate whatsoever and, conse-
quently, was precluded from a share of any martial assets, regardless of
their source. 5
In Kneece v. Kneece,88 also a divorce proceeding, the South Caro-
lina Court of Appeals endorsed the position that a civil service pension
was to be included in the marital estate. The court held the pension
was subject to equitable apportionment and distribution.
7
These two cases illustrate the slow change in the case law concern-
ing the treatment of pensions in divorce actions. Pensions are at issue
today largely because of the new article 6 of the Children's Code, which
is entitled "Equitable Apportionment of Marital Property" (Act).8
Before the Act became law, South Carolina case law was well set-
tled: military and civil service pensions were not to be included in the
marital estate.89 Pensions were to be considered, however, in determin-
83. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1988
(108th ed. 1987). This figure is for 1986 and is comprised of approximately 47,000 mili-
tary personnel and 20,000 civilian employees of the Department of Defense. Id. at 317.
84. 295 S.C. 286, 368 S.E.2d 89 (Ct. App. 1988).
85. Id at 288, 368 S.E.2d at 90.
86. 296 S.C. 28, 370 S.E.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1988).
87. Id. at 33-34, 370 S.E.2d at 291-92.
88. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-471 to -479 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1988).
89. See Bugg v. Bugg, 277 S.C. 270, 272, 286 S.E.2d 135, 137 (1982) (military pen-
sions not subject to equitable apportionment); Carter v. Carter, 277 S.C. 277, 279, 286
S.E.2d 139, 140 (1982) (civil service pensions not subject to equitable apportionment and
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ing whether payment of alimony was warranted and in setting the
amount."
The Act defines marital property as "all real and personal prop-
erty which has been acquired by the parties during the marriage and
which is owned as of the date of filing or commencement of marital
litigation . . . regardless of how legal title is held ... ."I' The Act
then lists five exceptions, none of which pertains directly to pensions.92
The obvious initial inquiry is whether pension rights are marital
"property" as contemplated by the Act.
The majority of other jurisdictions answer the inquiry affirma-
tively. 3 South Carolina case law gives no clear answer. Cases from the
supreme court antedate the passing of the Act, but nonetheless offer
some guidance. In Brown v. Brown94 the court gave its most definitive
exposition when it stated that "the final decision concerning the treat-
ment of military retirement funds remains with the states. We may
treat them as income . . . or, we may treat them as marital property
subject to equitable division. We prefer to treat the fund as income
and not as martial property. ' 95 The South Carolina rule treats military
pension payments as compensation for current services and not as de-
ferred compensation for prior services.99 This view is at odds with the
should be treated in a fashion similar to military pensions). These cases were decided
subsequent to a major upheaval in divorce litigation. In McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S.
210 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held the congressional intent underlying
the enactment of the military retirement program forbade state courts from denying re-
tirees the full benefit of their pensions by apportioning the pension benefits between
spouses in divorce proceedings. Id. at 227. This ruling disturbed many jurisdictions. For
a detailed analysis of pensions treatment in a pre-McCarty setting, see Annotation, Pen-
sion or Retirement Benefits as Subject to Award or Division by Court in Settlements of
Property Rights Between Spouses, 94 A.LR.3D 176 (1979). Congress reacted with re-
markable speed and enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 10
U.S.C.A. § 1408 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989). This statute restored to the states in marital
dissolution proceedings jurisdiction over military pension benefits and overruled Mc-
Carty. Subsequent to enactment of the federal statute, the South Carolina Supreme
Court noted that the statute allowed the state to make the final decision regarding the
treatment of military pensions. Brown v. Brown, 279 S.C. 116, 302 S.E.2d 860 (1983).
This decision resolved any uncertainty about the treatment of pensions subsequent to
McCarty.
90. See Haynes v. Haynes, 279 S.C. 162, 303 S.E.2d 429 (1983).
91. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-473 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
92. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-473(1) to (5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
93. Annotation, supra note 89, § 2(a), at 180.
94. 279 S.C. 116, 302 S.E.2d 860 (1983).
95. Id. at 118, 302 S.E.2d at 861.
96. This position is consonant with the reasoning found in McCarty. The United
States Supreme Court noted that military pensions were different from other pensions
for several reasons. First, the retiree remains a member of the Armed Services and is
subject to the Uniform Military Code of Justice. Second, the retiree may forfeit all or
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position that the pension benefits accrued during the marriage and,
thus, are marital assets. 7 A close reading of South Carolina Supreme
Court cases reveals the court has never used the term "property" when
discussing pension benefits. Instead, the court has used the terms
"fund" or "pay.''9s
The South Carolina Court of Appeals appears never to have ad-
dressed whether pension benefits are income. Rather, it has ap-
proached the issue by inquiring whether the benefits are to be treated
as marital property or as separate property. This approach has resulted
in the court giving separate treatment to the various types of pension
plans, such as civilian, military, voluntary, nonvoluntary, contributory,
noncontributory, vested, and mature.
In Watson v. Watson 9 the court held that a voluntary plan under
the discretionary control of the beneficiary is subject to equitable dis-
tribution. The court was careful to note that lower courts should not
mechanically make a decision based on the mere attaching of a label
describing the pension.100 Accordingly, the court set forth nine criteria
for lower courts to use to determine whether a pension plan should be
distributed. 01 Furthermore, the court offered in a footnote that the eq-
uitable distribution statute should be read as defining marital property
to include pensions. 102
Conversely, in Smith v. Smith0 3 the court of appeals held that a
pension plan in which the employer was the sole contributor was not
subject to equitable distribution. Although Smith precedes the new
Act, the court reaffirmed this holding in Hudson v. Hudson,04 which
part of his benefit if he engages in certain activities. Third, the retiree is subject to recall
to active duty. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1981). The court then con-
cluded that military retirement pay is actually reduced compensation for current activi-
ties. Id. at 222.
97. See Annotation, supra note 89, § 4(a), at 190-91.
98. See Brown v. Brown, 279 S.C. 116, 302 S.E.2d 860 (1983); Haynes v. Haynes,
279 S.C. 162, 303 S.E.2d 429 (1983); Bugg v. Bugg, 277 S.C. 270, 286 S.E.2d 135 (1982);
Carter v. Carter, 277 S.C. 277, 286 S.E.2d 139 (1982).
99. 291 S.C. 13, 351 S.E.2d 883 (Ct. App. 1986).
100. Id. at 17-18, 351 S.E.2d 886-87.
101. The nine factors are as follows: 1) whether the pension plan is mandatory for
all employees; 2) whether the spouse has control over the amount of funds deposited; 3)
whether funds in the plan are vested; 4) whether the funds are readily accessible to the
spouse; 5) whether the spouse has control over the plan's investments; 6) whether the
spouse has personally dealt with the plan; 7) whether a third party makes independent
judgments regarding loans from the plan or use of its property; 8) whether the spouse
uses assets of the plan without compensating for their use; 9) whether the plan meets
IRS requirements for pension plan tax provision. Id. at 18, 351 S.E.2d at 887.
102. Id. at 18 n.2, 351 S.E.2d at 886 n.2.
103. 280 S.C. 257, 312 S.E.2d 560 (Ct. App. 1984).
104. 294 S.C. 166, 363 S.E.2d 387 (Ct. App. 1987).
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was decided subsequent to the Act's enactment.
The above analysis demonstrates the confusion prevalent in South
Carolina case law concerning pensions (both civilian and military).
While older South Carolina Supreme Court cases define pensions as
income and not marital property, more recent court of appeals deci-
sions apparently consider pensions as marital property, but do not au-
tomatically include pension benefits in the marital estate. These vary-
ing conclusions raise an important question: What impact, if any, does
the equitable distribution statute have on this confusion?
When dealing with any new statute the first question must focus
on the intent of the legislature: Did the state assembly intend that
pensions be included in the marital estate? There is a paucity of legis-
lative history about this statute and thus there exists no simple answer
to the question.
In setting forth the factors courts should use to determine distri-
bution, the Act mentions retirement benefits and income.105 Assuming
retirement benefits and pensions are synonymous terms, the Act treats
income and pensions separately. One may suppose that if the legisla-
ture wished to follow the supreme court definition, then pensions
would not be mentioned or would be included specifically as income.
Assuming the legislature was aware of the supreme court definition of
military pensions as income, separate treatment of pensions gives rise
to the inference that the supreme court definition was rejected.
Conversely, the Act may be read to allow the apportioning court to
distribute property in a manner that compensates in some fashion for a
spouse's lack of retirement benefits. This interpretation is predicated
on the court's inability to divide the pension, since the pension is ei-
ther per se nonmarital property or not property at all.
With regard to cases decided subsequent to passage of the Act, it
should be noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed whether a civilian or military pension is subject to equitable
distribution. Although the court of appeals has not been entirely con-
105. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-472 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988). The relevant portions
of the statute read:
[T]he court shall make a final equitable apportionment between the parties of
the parties' marital property ....
In making apportionment, the court must give weight in such proportion
as it finds appropriate to all of the following factors:
(4) the income of each spouse, the earning potential of each spouse, and
the opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets;




et al.: Domestic Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1989
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sistent, its decisions reveal acknowledgement that the Act has had an
impact on the precedents that were controlling prior to the Act.
In Carter v. Carter"0 6 the South Carolina Supreme Court stated in
dicta, "Although contributions to any pension fund other than civil
service retirement funds are not presently at issue, we state for the
edification of the bench and bar that these contributions are generally
not subject to equitable distribution. 0 7 The court of appeals noted
the force of this statement in Smith v. Smith °s when it held a noncon-
tributory pension plan not subject to distribution.' 9 Nonetheless,
when confronted with a plan in which the contributions were volun-
tary, the court of appeals in Watson v. Watson"0 held such a plan
subject to distribution."'
Watson was decided approximately six months after the Act be-
came effective. Although the court predicated its holding by distin-
guishing the facts in Watson from those in Carter, it ignored the direc-
tive set forth by the supreme court in Carter. In addition, the court did
not rely on the new Act to justify its departure from Carter."2 As dis-
cussed above, the court mentioned the Act in dicta and indicated pen-
sions were subject to equitable distribution. In Watson, then, the court
of appeals seemed to shift away from the older precedents and indi-
cated the new Act would be interpreted to overrule the precedents con-
cerning pensions.
The same panel, however, in a case decided on the same day as
Watson, hewed closely to existing case law. In Eichor v. Eichor' 3 the
court of appeals upheld a dismissal of a petition to divide a military
pension under a Texas divorce decree. Interestingly, the Eichor opin-
ion is largely gratuitous dicta. The court of appeals determined that
the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the relief
sought. Such a determination is dispositive and the court had no com-
pelling reason to continue its analysis beyond that point. The court
proceeded, however, and determined that the case law in South Caro-
106. 277 S.C. 277, 286 S.E.2d 139 (1982).
107. Id. at 279, 286 S.E.2d at 140.
108. 280 S.C. 257, 312 S.E.2d 560 (Ct. App. 1984).
109. Id. at 262, 312 S.E.2d at 563.
110. 291 S.C. 13, 351 S.E.2d 883 (Ct. App. 1986).
111. Id. at 19, 351 S.E.2d at 887.
112. Indeed, the court of appeals in Wingard v. Wingard, 288 S.C. 644, 344 S.E.2d
191 (Ct. App. 1986), ignored the Carter directive prior to the Act's effective date. In
Wingard, the court remanded an equitable distribution with instructions to include em-
ployee purchased stock that was part of the retirement fund. Id. at 647, 344 S.E.2d at
193. Wingard and Watson are indicative of the disfavor with which the court of appeals
views the encompassing rules set forth by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
113. 290 S.C. 484, 351 S.E.2d 353 (Ct. App. 1986).
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lina would not allow the division of a military pension.114 Furthermore,
they made no reference to the new Act.
In Hudson v. Hudson"5 the court of appeals reaffirmed the rule it
stated in Smith and held a noncontributory pension not subject to eq-
uitable distribution." 6 Again, there was no mention of the new Act.
The following conclusion emerges from an analysis of these cases: In
cases such as military pensions in which the case law is well settled, the
court of appeals will not gratuitously invoke the new Act to reverse
controlling precedent. But when confronted with a pension plan having
no supreme court precedents, the court of appeals could include the
pension in the marital estate and perhaps rely on the new Act to jus-
tify such a decision.
Turning to the two cases on which this survey article is based, in
Walker v. Walker" 7 the family court found that per the Act, a military
pension was marital property subject to distribution. It further found,
however, that although the marriage had persisted for 24 years, 12 of
those years separated, there actually had never been a marital home
because the wife had lived with her parents. Consequently, the family
court held she was not entitled to an equitable distribution of her hus-
band's assets.
The court of appeals affirmed the latter determination and held it
dispositive. Therefore, it saw no need to decide whether to include the
pension in the marital estate and made no holding on the issue. In his
concurring opinion, Judge Goolsby acknowledged the footnote in Wat-
son that construed the Act to include military pensions in the marital
estate."'
If anything significant is to be gleaned from this case, it is a nega-
tive inference. The court made no statement as to how it might ap-
proach the pension issue in the future. Unlike Eichor, no dicta reiter-
ates existing case law. Furthermore, the court made no comment
regarding the family court holding concerning the military pension.
Kneece v. Kneece"9 is a more significant opinion. In that case a
marital estate was held subject to distribution. The pension at issue
was a civil service pension earned through work at the Charleston Na-
val Shipyard. The family court ruled the pension was not subject to
distribution because the fund was not vested. The court of appeals
held this factual determination was error and reversed. The fund had
114. Id. at 488, 351 S.E.2d at 355.
115. 294 S.C. 166, 363 S.E.2d 387 (Ct. App. 1987).
116. Id. at 168, 363 S.E.2d at 398.
117. 295 S.C. 286, 368 S.E.2d 89 (Ct. App. 1988).
118. Id. at 289, 368 S.E.2d at 90 (Goolsby, J., concurring).
119. 296 S.C. 28, 370 S.E.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1988).
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vested but had not yet matured. Citing the new Act, the court stated,
"The Act excludes certain property from the marital estate. No one
contends the civil services pension falls within one of the exclu-
sions." 20 The court did not dispute the conclusion that the pension
was marital property subject to equitable distribution. In light of the
rule that courts will correct mistaken assumptions of law, even those
made by the parties themselves and not the tribunal,' 21 it may be in-
ferred that the court itself did not believe the pension fell within one
of the exclusions.
Although not called upon to construe the Act, the Kneece court
endorsed the position that civil service pensions were marital property
subject to distribution. This position directly conflicts with that stated
in Carter. As a result, this court of appeals' opinion sanctions a legal
position in direct conflict with existing case law.
Thus, it is clear that Walker is important, if at all, for what was
not said. The court failed to dispute a family court's determination
that a military pension is marital property subject to equitable distri-
bution as defined by the equitable distribution statute. In Kneece, for
the first time, conflicting authority has arisen in the appellate courts
regarding the inclusion of civil service pensions in the marital estate.
The court of appeals appears to be moving slowly in the direction of
including military and civilian pensions within the ambit of the new
Act.
Of course, the South Carolina Supreme Court has yet to rule on
these issues. It seems possible, if not probable, that the court will
maintain its view that military pensions are current income for re-
duced current services. If this view prevails, the new Act would be in-
applicable and the court would not be compelled to reverse existing
case law. Civil service pensions, however, do not have the characteris-
tics that make military pensions unique, and thus the court may feel




120. Id. at 33, 370 S.E.2d at 291.
121. See Berry v. Berry, 290 S.C. 351, 357, 350 S.E.2d 398, 402 (Ct. App. 1986)
(court refused to accept a concession of a party to the suit because the concession was
contrary to established law), aff'd, 294 S.C. 334, 364 S.E.2d 463 (1988).
122. One commentator, Professor Randall Chastain, has expressed the opinion that
the new statute should be read to include all pensions regardless of their source. He
states:
It will be noted that none of the exclusions from the comprehensively inclusive
general definition can include pension rights .... Since no exclusion includes
pension rights or other vested retirement interests, it is impossible to avoid
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V. VESTED MILITARY PENSION BENEFITS HELD MARITAL ASSET
SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
In Martin v. Martin12 3 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held,
in direct opposition to South Carolina Supreme Court rulings as recent
as 1983,124 that vested military retirement benefits are marital property
subject to equitable distribution. The supreme court's rulings, however,
were prior to the passage of the South Carolina Equitable Apportion-
ment of Marital Property Act (Act),125 which made considerable
changes in South Carolina law in this area. Because this case presented
the issue for the first time since the Act's passage, prior supreme court
cases were not binding precedent upon the court of appeals. The Mar-
tin ruling aligns South Carolina with the vast majority of jurisdictions
that have considered the issue.
The military pension in this case belonged to the husband, who
retired from the Air Force in 1976 after 20 years of service. The Mar-
tins were married in 1971 and separated in 1985. Mr. Martin com-
menced divorce proceedings one year later. The husband received a
gross monthly benefit of $739.00, with a net benefit of $624.00. The
wife submitted expert testimony that assumed a twenty-seven year life
expectancy for the husband, a constant income stream of $735.00 per
month, and a 1.1 percent discount rate. The expert estimated the pen-
sion's present value at $205,950.00. The trial court accepted this
value.'26 The court held that only one-fourth of the pension was mari-
tal property, presumably because Mr. Martin was married only five of
the twenty years during which he accumulated the pension. 127 The
court then apportioned 20 percent of the one-fourth to the wife. Al-
though the court did not actually distribute any of the pension to the
wife, she received other assets to offset this portion of the fund, which
was retained by the husband in its entirety.
128
While the decision marks a distinct change in South Carolina law
with regard to this issue, the court demonstrated no reluctance to
make the change. The court relied to a great extent on the fact that
the conclusion that the statute includes retirement benefits, at least those
which are "owned" or vested, as divisible marital property.
R. CHASTAIN, THE LAW OF DoAtEsTIc RELATIONS IN SOUTH CAROLINA 40 (1986) (emphasis
in original).
123. 296 S.C. 436, 373 S.E.2d 706 (Ct. App. 1988).
124. See Haynes v. Haynes, 279 S.C. 162, 303 S.E.2d 429 (1983).
125. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-471 to -479 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
126. Martin, 296 S.C. at 439, 373 S.E.2d at 708.
127. See id. at 438-39, 373 S.E.2d at 707-08.
128. Id. at 440, 373 S.E.2d at 708.
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the Act does not list pensions as an exception to marital property. 29
The court noted that the South Carolina Supreme Court used the same
rationale in Orszula v. Orszula'30 to hold that personal injury and
workers' compensation awards may constitute marital property.131
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly to the court, the vast
majority of states recently considering the issue have determined that
military pensions do constitute marital property. The court twice re-
ferred to In re Marriage of Gallo, 3' in which the Colorado Supreme
Court overruled its prior decisions and declared that vested military
pensions are subject to equitable distribution. 33 As noted in Gallo,
South Carolina was one of only five states in which pensions were
deemed not to be marital property.
134
Now that vested pensions clearly are to be considered marital
property, courts will face the difficult task of valuation and distribu-
tion. The court in Martin mentioned two methods of valuation, the
present cash value method and the reserve jurisdiction method. 35
Under the present cash value method, the court calculates the present
value of the pension, and determines the percentage of this value that
is attributable to the marriage. The court then usually awards the pen-
sion to the employee-spouse and awards offsetting assets to the nonem-
ployee-spouse.1 36 Under the reserve jurisdiction method, distribution is
delayed until actual benefit payments are received.
3 7
Of the two methods, the present cash value method generally is
favored because the entire distribution can be completed at the time of
the divorce litigation or settlement.1 38 The reserve jurisdiction method
often requires continued supervision by the court long after the decree
is entered. 139 As in Martin, the trial court usually has wide discretion
in determining the method of valuation and distribution.
Use of the present cash value method can place considerable hard-
ship on the employee-spouse, since a substantial portion of the marital
estate frequently is awarded to the nonemployee-spouse to offset the
pension, which is usually retained by the employee-spouse. In fact, in
129. See id. at 438-39, 373 S.E.2d at 708 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-473 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1988)).
130. 292 S.C. 264, 356 S.E.2d 114 (1987).
131. Martin, 296 S.C. at 439, 373 S.E.2d at 708.
132. 752 P.2d 47 (Colo. 1988).
133. Martin, 296 S.C. at 439 n.1, 440-41 n.2, 373 S.E.2d at 708 n.1, 709 n.2.
134. See Gallo, 752 P.2d at 53 n.9.
135. See Martin, 296 S.C. at 440 n.2, 373 S.E.2d at 709 n.2.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Johnson v. Johnson, 131 Ariz. 38, 41-42, 638 P.2d 705, 708-09 (1981).
139. In re Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47, 55 (Colo. 1988).
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some cases the remaining marital assets may not be enough to offset
the pension. In such cases, the present cash value method will not be
available. 4" Courts then often will use the reserve jurisdiction method,
which places less of a burden upon the employee spouse.
If the present cash value method is used, counsel for both sides
should be careful to see that an interest rate fair to his or her client is
used to value the pension. In Martin the wife's expert proposed an
interest rate of 1.1 percent, and since the husband submitted no other
rate, that interest rate was used. The rate placed the present value of
$735.00 per month for twenty-seven years at $205,950.00.
Most cases use discount rates that are somewhat higher. In Siefert
v. Siefert,"" for example, the court used a discount rate of 10 percent.
If the Martin court had used 10 percent, instead of 1.1 percent, the
husband's pension would have been valued at $82,205.00, instead of
$205,950.00. Using the higher discount rate would have permitted the
husband to have given up less value in other marital assets to offset the
retained pension. A court presented with evidence from both sides
would probably find the appropriate discount rate to be somewhere be-
tween the 1.1 percent used in Martin and the 10 percent used in
Siefert.
William H. Johnson
VI. TRANSMUTATION DocTRINE SURVIVES EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
OF MARITAL PROPERTY ACT
In 1986 the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Equitable Ap-
portionment of Marital Property Act 42 (Act) to govern the distribution
of assets in divorce proceedings. Not until 1988 did the South Carolina
appellate courts have the opportunity to determine the effect of the
new statute upon the prevalent common law doctrine of transmuta-
tion,14 3 which is not discussed in the statute. After two years of waiting
140. Id.
141. 82 N.C. App. 329, 346 S.E.2d 504 (1986), aff'd, 319 N.C. 367, 354 S.E.2d 506
(1987).
142. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-471 to -479 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
143. Transmutation is a doctrine by which nonmarital property is converted into
marital property for the facilitation of divorce settlements. The South Carolina Supreme
Court has recognized that transmutation "'may occur when the property becomes so
commingled as to be untraceable; is utilized by the parties in support of the marriage; or
is titled jointly or otherwise utilized in such a manner as to evidence an intent by the
parties to make it marital property.'" Trinnal v. Trimnal, 287 S.C. 495, 497-98, 339
S.E.2d 869, 870 (1986) (quoting Hussey v. Hussey, 280 S.C. 418, 423, 312 S.E.2d 267, 270-
71 (Ct. App. 1984)). The 1988 decisions of the South Carolina Court of Appeals discuss
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for a post-Act case to reach the appellate level, the court of appeals
seized upon three cases from which to interpret the new law. All three
of the cases were decided by the court of appeals within a period of six
months, and all three expressly upheld the common law doctrine of
transmutation.
The doctrine is most prominent in states in which divorce law al-
lows equitable distribution in the division of marital assets. 4 4 Equita-
ble distribution is allowed in this state and transmutation has long
been considered in calculating divorce settlements. South Carolina
Code section 20-7-4731"5 defines marital property as "all real and per-
sonal property which has been acquired by the parties during the mar-
riage ... ."I's In further specifying what property is to be considered,
the Code expressly excludes "property acquired by either party before
the marriage .... ,,147 Because the Act omits any reference to trans-
mutation, its passage has created confusion as to the doctrine's viabil-
ity. Consequently, the recent cases have been awaited with much
speculation.
In Kendall v. Kendal148 the South Carolina Court of Appeals af-
firmed a family court ruling that implicitly upheld the common law
doctrine of transmutation. The court's decision was the first review of
the transmutation doctrine since the General Assembly passed the Eq-
uitable Apportionment of Marital Property Act. Kendall was a divorce
action involving a dispute over the distribution of a couple's assets. Mr.
Kendall purchased a house while living with a woman whom he later
married. The Kendalls remained married for a period of eighteen
months and then separated. In awarding the wife an interest in the
house, the family court implicitly held that the house had been trans-
muted marital property once it was used in furtherance of the mar-
riage. 140 The husband appealed, arguing the new statute supplanted
the doctrine of transmutation. The court of appeals disagreed, holding
that transmutation survived passage of the new act."5"
Kendall was significant as the first transmutation case heard after
transmutation only in terms of the third requirement (i.e. intent).
144. Most states subscribe to equitable distribution as a method of dividing assets
upon divorce. Community property states (Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin) do not employ equitable distri-
bution, nor do Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, or Ohio, states in which no statute exists for
dividing marital property. Divorce Law By States, [Reference File and Tax Guide] Fain.
L. Rep. (BNA) 400:ii (March 24, 1986).
145. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-473 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988).
146. Id.
147. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-473(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986).
148. 295 S.C. 136, 367 S.E.2d 437 (Ct. App. 1988).
149. See id. at 136, 367 S.E.2d at 437.
150. Id. at 137, 367 S.E.2d at 438.
[Vol. 41
22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol41/iss1/7
DOMESTIc LAW
the new Act became law, but the opinion was brief and only estab-
lished survival of the doctrine. The court left particulars of the doc-
trine to be defined by later cases. Six months after Kendall, two cases
were decided in which the court of appeals expanded its explanation of
the doctrine. In Johnson v. Johnson151 and Bryan v. Bryan'5' the court
of appeals restored the transmutation doctrine to its pre-Act status.
Johnson involved a dentist who convinced his girlfriend to marry
him and dispose of all her property. Five days before the wedding, she
was urged to sign an antenuptial agreement drafted by his lawyer. The
marriage rapidly deteriorated and the wife eventually left Johnson, by
whom she had been physically and mentally abused.153 The family
court declared the antenuptial agreement void on the basis of duress,
since the wife was led to believe the wedding would not take place un-
less she signed the agreement.15 4 Having declared the antenuptial
agreement void, the family court judge granted the wife's petition for
equitable distribution. In the process of equitable distribution, the
judge stated that certain "disputed property" "probably" was trans-
muted into marital property.'55 This finding of transmutation was re-
versed on appeal.5 56 The court of appeals noted that "[t]he record dis-
closed a clear, consistent intent of Dr. Johnson to maintain the
nonmarital character of all property he acquired before the
marriage."1
57
Although the court of appeals determined the property had not
been transmuted, its determination was based on the lack of requisite
intent to transmute, not on the doctrine's demise. Explaining the doc-
trine of transmutation, the Johnson court pointed out that transmuta-
tion is a matter of intent, dictated by the facts in each case. The court
instructed that "[t]he primacy of the parties' intent in determining if
property is marital or nonmarital is underscored by the Act itself,
which permits the parties to exclude property from the marital estate
by written agreement."' 58
Johnson's companion case, Bryan, also provided insight into the
post-Act dynamics of transmutation. In Bryan the couple's residence
was acquired after the parties were married and was, therefore, prima
facie marital property. The wife contended, however, that because the
residence had been purchased with her assets and by no efforts of the
151. 296 S.C. 289, 372 S.E.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1988).
152. 296 S.C. 305, 372 S.E.2d 116 (Ct. App. 1988).
153. Johnson, 296 S.C. at 291-92, 372 S.E.2d at 108-09.
154. Id. at 292, 372 S.E.2d at 109.
155. Id. at 293, 372 S.E.2d at 109.
156. Id. at 296, 372 S.E.2d at 111.
157. Id.
158. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-473(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988)).
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husband, the residence was her separate property. In fact, the house
had been purchased with funds that were commingled by the husband
and wife. 10 9
The court of appeals affirmed the finding of the lower court that
"all nonmarital property brought into the marriage by both parties lost
its identity by mixing the proceeds therefrom with the marital income
of the parties."160 Once identity of the funds as nonmarital property
was lost, the money used to purchase the home necessarily made the
home marital property. As in Johnson, the court of appeals relied on
the intent of the parties to determine whether property was marital in
character. The court stated that "[t]aken as a whole, the objective evi-
dence unmistakeably [sic] show[ed] the parties intended the residence
to be marital property.'
61
Since the doctrine of transmutation is alive in South Carolina af-
ter the new Act, the remaining question is whether transmutation will
exist unaffected or whether the new law will require some alteration of
the incidents of the common law doctrine. Based on the 1988 decisions
of the South Carolina Court of Appeals, the doctrine of transmutation
apparently will undergo only one significant change as a result of the
Equitable Apportionment of Marital Property Act.
In Kendall, the first of the three 1988 cases, the court of appeals
stated:
While it is presumed that the legislature had full knowledge and in-
formation as to prior judicial decisions and existing law on the subject
of equitable distribution, it is also presumed that the legislature did
not intend to overthrow or depart from established principles of law
beyond what it declares either expressly or by necessary
implication." 2
With this statement, the court of appeals announced its refusal to
abandon the doctrine of transmutation.
Furthermore, the court in Johnson cited Trimnal v. Trimnal,"6' a
pre-Act case, to establish the existence of the transmutation doc-
trine.1 4 The Johnson court also quoted over a dozen recent transmuta-
tion cases to establish the parameters of the doctrine, more evidence of
its survival. 10 5 In two of the 1988 cases, however, a subtle change in the
159. See Bryan v. Bryan, 296 S.C. 305, 308-09, 372 S.E.2d 116, 118-19 (Ct. App.
1988).
160. Id. at 308, 372 S.E.2d at 118.
161. Id. at 309, 372 S.E.2d at 118.
162. Kendall, 295 S.C. at 137, 367 S.E.2d at 438.
163. 287 S.C. 495, 339 S.E.2d 869 (1986).
164. See Johnson, 296 S.C. at 295, 372 S.E.2d at 110.
165. See id. at 295-96 nn.2-4, 372 S.E.2d at 110-11 nn.2-4.
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workings of the doctrine came to light.
By focusing solely on the intent of the parties, the court of appeals
in Johnson and Bryan effectively reduced from three to one the num-
ber of ways property can be transmuted.' 6 Given that the court of ap-
peals was quoted for the possible methods of transmuting property in
Trimnal, the court's reduction of the three elements to one cannot be
an oversight. The court of appeals apparently intended to simplify ju-
dicial inquiries into the subject of transmutation.
While the court of appeals' new rule concerning methods of trans-
mutation may be an improvement in the law, the supreme court has
not yet approved the single-method rule. Consequently, two rules now
exist in South Carolina. In the court of appeals, nonmarital property
cannot be transmuted without a showing of intent. In the supreme
court, nonmarital property can be transmuted even without a showing
of intent if such property is "'so commingled as to become untrace-
able; is utilized by the parties in support of the marriage; or is titled
jointly .... , "167 Property is less likely to be transmuted under the
court of appeals' new rule, since intent must be shown even when prop-
erty is commingled, titled jointly, or utilized in support of the mar-
riage. Accordingly, transmutation may become less common in South
Carolina despite the doctrine's survival of the Equitable Apportion-
ment of Marital Property Act.
J. Thornton Kirby
VII. CUSTODIAL PARENT'S FLAGRANT PROMISCUITY RESULTS IN
CHANGE OF CUSTODY
The determination of whether the custody of a minor should be
changed generally is within the sound discretion of the family court
judge."'68 The South Carolina Court of Appeals, however, held in
Boykin v. Boykin 6 9 that a custodial parent's flagrant promiscuity com-
pels a change of custody, even if other factors weigh in favor of the
parent's fitness. This holding departs from the approach taken in pre-
vious custody cases involving issues of parental sexual practices. In ear-
lier cases morality was one of several factors to be considered and was
limited in importance by its demonstrated effect on the child.17 0
166. See supra note 143.
167. Trimnal, 287 S.C. at 497-98, 339 S.E.2d at 870 (quoting Hussey v. Hussey, 280
S.C. 418, 423, 312 S.E.2d 267, 270-71 (Ct. App. 1984)).
168. Adams v. Adams, 262 S.C. 85, 202 S.E.2d 639 (1974).
169. 296 S.C. 100, 370 S.E.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1988).
170. See, e.g., Davenport v. Davenport, 265 S.C. 524, 220 S.E.2d 228 (1975).
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Mr. and Mrs. Boykin were divorced in 1985 on grounds of Mrs.
Boykin's adultery. The court awarded custody the couple's four-year-
old daughter to the mother by consent decree. After the divorce Mrs.
Boykin worked an evening shift and left the child with her mother on
workdays. Mrs. Boykin drank and used marijuana with friends after
work. She also admitted to a promiscuous lifestyle, having had affairs
with at least five men in one year.171 On April 3, 1986, the father peti-
tioned the family court for a change of custody. The family court or-
dered that the mother retain custody of the child.
172
Reversing the order, the court of appeals distinguished previous
cases dealing with single instances of illicit sexual conduct, asserting
that this was a case of first impression involving the flagrant promiscu-
ity of a custodial parent.173 The court recited the familiar test for a
change of custody: the party seeking to change custody must show a
change of conditions which substantially affects the welfare of the
child.174 Even though the record contained evidence of Mrs. Boykin's
redeeming qualities, the court held that such flagrant promiscuity
would inevitably affect the welfare of the child, thus requiring a change
of custody to protect the child's best interests.
1 75
The court of appeals held the mother's flagrant promiscuity would
have an inevitable adverse impact on the child's welfare, even in the
absence of a showing that the child had previously been exposed to or
otherwise directly affected by the mother's misconduct. 76 This is
somewhat surprising in light of the court's relatively recent decision in
Stroman v. Williams.
177
In Stroman, decided just one year prior to the present case, the
court refused to change child custody, even though the custodial
mother was admittedly involved in a homosexual affair. The Stroman
court held the father had not met his burden of proof that the child's
best interest required a change of custody, because no evidence was
presented that the child was "being exposed to deviant sexual acts or
that her welfare was being adversely affected in any substantial
way."'
79
The court in Boykin distinguished Stroman and other cases in-
volving affairs of custodial parents by noting that those cases involved
171. Boykin, 296 S.C. at 102, 370 S.E.2d at 886.
172. Id. at 101, 370 S.E.2d at 885.
173. Id. at 101-02, 370 S.E.2d at 885-86.
174. Id. at 101, 370 S.E.2d at 885.
175. Id. at 102, 370 S.E.2d at 886.
176. Id.
177. 291 S.C. 376, 353 S.E.2d 704 (Ct. App. 1987).
178. Id. at 379, 353 S.E.2d at 705.
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custodial parents who had engaged in a single sexual affair. 179 Further-
more, the court abandoned the rule that evidence of a parent's im-
moral behavior is relevant only to the extent the proponent of the cus-
tody change can show the behavior has affected the child. Comparing
Boykin with Stroman, the court's distinction between cases involving
more than one sexual affair and those involving a single encounter
seems tenuous at best. The custodial parent in Stroman maintained an
illicit homosexual relationship in the household in which her daughters
lived for over five years.
The court's determination to announce the rule that a flagrantly
promiscuous parent is unfit as a matter of law was manifested in two
ways. First, the court clearly indicated that it would not be bound by
appellate procedure. The respondent argued that the appellant's ex-
ceptions were not properly raised, but the argument was quickly re-
jected by the court, which clearly intended to reach the merits. Second,
the court was undaunted by the concerns it voiced in Stroman, in
which it said that "an appellate court should be reluctant to substitute
its own evaluation of what the evidence dictates in terms of child cus-
tody for that of the trial court."'180
It is difficult to reconcile the Boykin rule with the tolerant ration-
ale of Stroman,'81 aside from perhaps the existence of drug abuse or
the indiscreet nature of the misconduct in Boykin. Although the court
offered no guidance as to what facts will constitute flagrant promiscu-
ity and compel a change of custody in future cases, it is plain that such
a finding will obviate the need for a further showing of direct impact
on the child.
Weyman C. Carter
VIII. JOINT CUSTODY GENERALLY DISFAVORED BY SOUTH CAROLINA
COURTS
During this century, child custody law in the United States has
moved from a presumption that the mother be granted custody of
young children to the current "best interests of the child" standard.1
2
179. Boykin, 296 S.C. at 102, 370 S.E.2d at 886.
180. Stroman, 291 S.C. at 380, 353 S.E.2d at 706.
181. The concluding sentence of Judge Sanders' concurring opinion in Stroman con-
veyed the apparent attitude of the court: "We are not in the business of gratuitously
judging the private lives of other people." Id. at 381, 353 S.E.2d at 707 (Sanders, C.J.,
concurring).
182. Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fic-
tions, 5 YALE. L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 267-68 (1987).
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Although in fact it may not be in the best interests of the child for
either of the parents to have custody or to engage in a bitter custody
dispute, this standard has traditionally resulted in one of the parents
retaining custody. 8 3 In applying this standard courts have addressed
the following factors: The child's interrelationship with his parents and
siblings; the preference of the child; the age, health, and sex of the
child; the prospective home environment, associates, and opportunities
for the child; the conduct and suitability of the parents; the financial
condition of the parents; and the desires of the parents.8'8 The applica-
tion of these factors resulted in a strong bias toward granting custody
to the mother.
8 5
More recently, however, courts have begun to move away from the
award of custody to just one parent. At the insistence of social scien-
tists, feminists and men's groups, courts are now awarding joint cus-
tody more frequently.86 These groups argue that joint or shared cus-
tody better preserves the traditional family role by allowing the child
to develop closer bonds with both parents, and gives each parent a
more fulfilling role in child rearing by preserving each parent's interest
in the child's development.
8 7
Currently there is much debate among commentators concerning
awards of joint custody. Some commentators recommend a presump-
tion of joint custody, 88 while others argue that joint custody should
only be awarded in limited circumstances.8 9 States have responded in
various ways, with thirty-three states enacting statutes concerning
joint custody.9 0 In South Carolina the legislature has not responded to
this debate and the appellate courts have given little guidance in es-
tablishing standards for joint custody.
183. See Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change
in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARv. L. REV. 727, 732 n.14 (1988).
184. 27C C.J.S. Divorce §§ 620-627 (1986).
185. See Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 16 FAM. L.Q.
289, 290 (1983) ("[A]t least 90% of custody decisions give sole custody to the mother and
visitation rights to the father.").
186. See Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 21 FAM.
L.Q. 417, 523 (1988) (noting an observable increase in the number of joint custody
awards); Foster & Freed, Life With Father: 1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321, 340-41 (1978) ("Prior
judicial experience with joint custody awards led to disapprpval of such a custodial ar-
rangement, but the principal of sexual equality has moved a few courts to try experimen-
tal decrees.").
187. See Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981).
188. See Schwartz, Toward a Presumption of Joint Custody, 18 FAm. L.Q. 225
(1984).
189. See Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn,
and the Judicial and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 739 (1983).
190. See Freed & Walker, supra note 186, at 520 table IX.
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The South Carolina Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed that
the "best interests of the child" standard applies in determining cus-
tody. In Cook v. Cobb19' the court stated that "[t]he welfare of the
child and what is in his/her best interest is the primary, paramount
and controlling consideration of the court in all child custody contro-
versies. ' ' 19 2 The court further stated that "[i]n determining the best
interest of the child, the court undertakes the awesome task of looking
into the past and predicting which of the two available environments
will advance the best interest of the child and bring about the best
adjusted mature individual.
1 93
Although the court has not stated the criteria for applying the
"best interests of the child" standard, it has enunciated certain appli-
cable principles. In Ford v. Ford19 the court stated that one of the
factors in determining custody is the age, health, and sex of the child.
This factor often is referred to as the "tender years doctrine."'19 Under
this doctrine, the mother is given a preference in custody determina-
tions during the formative years. 96 Although this doctrine has been
argued as a presumption in some jurisdictions, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court has stated explicitly that the tender years doctrine does
not require that the mother receive custody, but that it is merely one
factor to be considered. 97 In cases involving much older children, the
court has shown a greater willingness to give weight to the wishes of
the child. 198
Another factor recently recognized in South Carolina is the "pri-
mary caretaker doctrine." Although this doctrine traditionally has not
been a part of South Carolina law, in West v. West' 99 the South Caro-
lina Court of Appeals justified an award of custody to a father based
largely on the fact that he had been primarily responsible for the care
of the children. 00 While the doctrine applies equally to both fathers
191. 271 S.C. 136, 245 S.E.2d 612 (1978).
192. Id. at 140, 245 S.E.2d at 614 (citing Davenport v. Davenport, 265 S.C. 524, 220
S.E.2d 228 (1975); Peay v. Peay, 260 S.C. 108, 194 S.E.2d 392 (1973); Koon v. Koon, 203
S.C. 556, 28 S.E.2d 89 (1943)).
193. Id. at 142, 245 S.E.2d at 615.
194. 242 S.C. 344, 130 S.E.2d 916 (1963).
195. Id. at 352, 130 S.E.2d at 921.
196. Id.
197. Green v. Loveday, 270 S.C. 410, 412, 242 S.E.2d 441, 442 (1978).
198. See Guinan v. Guinan, 254 S.C. 554, 176 S.E.2d 173 (1970). This case involved
a custody dispute over a 16 year old boy. The court stated that "ordinarily, the wishes of
a child of this boy's age, intelligence and experience, although probably not controlling,
are entitled to great weight in awarding his custody as between estranged parents." Id. at
55, 176 S.E.2d at 174 (citation omitted).
199. 294 S.C. 190, 363 S.E.2d 402 (Ct. App. 1987).
200. See id. at 193, 363 S.E.2d at 403.
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and mothers, it is particularly persuasive when the husband has been
the primary caretaker. A third factor to be taken into account by the
court is the morality of the parent. 01 The "morality factor," however,
traditionally has been limited to acts or events which have a direct or
indirect impact on the welfare of the child.20 2
More generally, in Ford v. Ford203 the court enunciated the type of
framework in which custody determinations should be made. It stated
that among the factors to be considered are "the residence, surround-
ings and opportunities afforded in the respective environments; the
conduct and suitability of parents; the preference in favor of the inno-
cent or prevailing party; the financial condition of the parents; agree-
ments between parties, and others. '20 4 Although these factors may ap-
pear general, that is the nature of custody determinations. Neither the
appellate courts nor the legislature have given family courts much
guidance as to the weight of each factor, but instead have given much
discretion to the family court judge.
Although there has been a strong national trend toward joint cus-
tody, South Carolina courts have not participated in this change. In
fact, neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court has ever suffi-
ciently delineated the factors which should be considered in granting
joint or divided custody.20 5
In Henry v. Henry20 6 the court of appeals stated in dicta that joint
custody should not be granted when there is a combative relationship
between the parties. This statement, however, is little more than a
clarification of the state's traditional position, enunciated in Mixson v.
Mixson 20 7 and Sharpe v. Sharpe,10 that the best interests of the child
demand that divided custody should be approved only under excep-
tional circumstances. In Mixson, the supreme court offered its reasons
for disapproving of joint custody, stating:
"[O]rdinarily it is not conducive to the best interests and welfare of a
201. See Boykin v. Boykin, 296 S.C. 100, 370 S.E.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1988) (mother's
promiscuity and use of illicit drugs considered when court granted father's request to
change custody).
202. See Davenport v. Davenport, 265 S.C. 524, 220 S.E.2d 228 (1975) (custody
awarded to mother who had an adulterous relationship in the home after separation
while the children were there, since no evidence of ill effect on the children was
demonstrated).
203. 242 S.C. 344, 130 S.E.2d 916 (1963).
204. Id. at 352, 130 S.E.2d at 921.
205. The South Carolina courts appear to use the terms "divided custody" and
"joint custody" interchangeably. See Henry v. Henry, 296 S.C. 285, 372 S.E.2d 104 (Ct.
App. 1988).
206. Id.
207. 253 S.C. 436, 171 S.E.2d 581 (1969).
208. 256 S.C. 517, 183 S.E.2d 325 (1971).
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child for it to be shifted and shuttled back and forth in alternate brief
periods between contending parties, particularly during the school
term. Furthermore, such an arrangement is likely to cause confusion,
interfere with the proper training and discipline of the child, make the
child the basis of many quarrels between its custodians, render its life
unhappy and discontented, and prevent it from living a normal
life.,,209
The supreme court's distaste for joint custody is exemplified by its
holding in Courie v. Courie.210 In Courie the court remanded to the
trial court a visitation provision awarding the father 165 days per year
of visitation because it found the award excessive and thus equivalent
to divided custody. Consequently, the liberal visitation provision was
deemed undesirable.
Indeed, the only South Carolina Supreme Court case allowing di-
vided custody is Sanders v. Sanders.211 In that case the court found
the trial judge had not abused his discretion by awarding the husband
custody of the children on alternate weekends and during certain hours
every week, even though neither party had sought joint custody. This
case, however, appears to be an anomaly.
Because the supreme court generally has disapproved of joint cus-
tody decrees, family court judges in South Carolina make such custody
awards only in very limited circumstances.212 Some judges will allow
joint custody when the parties present the court with a custody agree-
ment.213 If the judge believes that this is a true agreement between the
parties, and if the facts of the case indicate the agreement can be car-
ried out in a stable environment without interfering with the child's
maturation, then the judge may grant the request for joint custody.
21
4
The parents, however, must prove to the judge that each is fair and
understanding and that the primary concern of each is the health and
well-being of the child.21 5 It takes "unusual people" to accomplish this
task.21 6 Only then will the court allow joint custody.
217
That there are so few appellate cases upholding joint custody is
not surprising since cases in which joint custody has been permitted at
209. Mixson, 253 S.C. at 447, 171 S.E.2d at 586 (quoting 2 J. HENDERSON, NELSON ON
DiVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 15.17 (2d ed. 1945)).
210. 288 S.C. 163, 341 S.E.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1986).
211. 232 S.C. 625, 103 S.E.2d 281 (1958).
212. Telephone interview with Hon. Robert H. Burnside, South Carolina Family








et al.: Domestic Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1989
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the family court level were generally those in which there was little
disagreement between the husband and wife about a joint custody
award. Consequently, since South Carolina appellate courts have had
an opportunity to rule only in situations that were not amenable to
joint custody, the fact that they have not ruled them out altogether
suggests they would uphold joint custody in those rare circumstances
in which there is a congenial relationship between all the parties and
the children can maintain a stable lifestyle.
It would be preferable, however, for the legislature to act in this
area. A large amount of research and commentary concerning the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of joint custody currently exists. In order
to give judges better guidance and lawyers a greater degree of predict-
ability with which to service their clients, the legislature should adopt
a concrete set of standards explaining when joint custody should be
granted.
First, the legislation should provide that the family court should
consider joint custody upon the motion of either party. Second, the
legislation should provide that in making a determination on the mo-
tion the court should consider the ability of the parents to work coop-
eratively and effectively toward the best interests of the child; the resi-
dential circumstances of each parent, including the proximity of the
homes and the extent to which it impinges upon school arrangements.
Furthermore, the legislation should stress the need to properly con-
sider those factors important in all child custody determinations, in-
cluding, the age, health, and sex of the child; the child's preference; the
ability of each parent to devote sufficient time to the child; and the
child's interrelationships with his or her parents and siblings. By
adopting such guidelines, the legislature could lend much needed guid-
ance to family courts, thus helping to insure that in custody determi-
nations the goal of protecting "the best interests of the child" is
accomplished.
Frank C. Williams III
IX. COURT INVoKES "GOOD CAUSE" EXCEPTION TO AvoID INDIAN
CHILD WELFARE ACT'S REQUIREMENT THAT STATE TRANSFER INDIAN
CHILD PLACEMENT CASE TO TRIBAL COURT
In 1978 Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).18
to protect the interests of Indian children and to promote the stability
and security of Indian tribes and families. Ten years later, the South
218. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911-1963 (1982).
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Carolina Court of Appeals addressed the jurisdictional ramifications of
the ICWA for the first time. In Chester County Department of Social
Services v. Coleman219 the court of appeals held that a family court
erred in transferring a case to a tribal court pursuant to the ICWA by
failing to consider if "good cause" existed to keep the case in a South
Carolina court.220 By its holding in Coleman, the court of appeals
adopted reasoning utilized in a majority of jurisdictions to establish an
exception to the mandatory transfer provision in Indian child place-
ment cases.
The Coleman decision hinges upon crucial language found in sec-
tion 1911(b) of the Act, which requires state courts to transfer Indian
child placement cases to tribal courts unless there is "good cause to the
contrary. 2 21 By focusing on this language, the court of appeals cor-
rectly emphasized the degree of discretion state courts have in apply-
ing the ICWA.
222
Phyllis Coleman, the appellant, and her four daughters, two from
a previous marriage and two from her present husband, Joe Coleman,
were members of the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe in South Dakota. In
1983 the Chester County Department of Social Services (DSS) moved
to have the children placed under its custody due to actual and
threatened physical harm to the children. The court ordered that the
girls be placed with DSS.2 23 In May 1984, the Department petitioned
the court to return the children to the parents. Subsequently, DSS
amended the petition to add allegations of sexual abuse against the
parents. The court found the girls had been sexually abused, and thus
ordered that they be placed with the corresponding Department of So-
cial Services in South Dakota.224 The parents appealed that decision
and the supreme court remanded the case to the family court for
proper placement.225
219. 296 S.C. 355, 372 S.E.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam).
220. Id. at 359, 372 S.E.2d at 915.
221. See id. at 357-58, 372 S.E.2d at 914. Section 1911(b) of the ICWA provides:
In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of ... an Indian
child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child's
tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer
such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either par-
ent ... or the Indian child's tribe ....
15 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
222. See Note, Indian Child Welfare: A Jurisdictional Approach, 21 ARIz. L. REV.
1123, 1142 (1979) (stating that the ICWA legislative history requires state courts to ap-
ply a "modified" doctrine of forum non conveniens to determine if good cause exists to
retain jurisdiction).
223. Coleman, 296 S.C. at 356, 372 S.E.2d at 913.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 356-57, 372 S.E.2d at 913.
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On remand, the Indian Child Welfare Coordinator for the Chey-
enne River Sioux tribe moved to transfer the case to the Cheyenne
River Sioux Juvenile Court in South Dakota pursuant to the ICWA.
The family court ordered the transfer and the children appealed. 226
The court of appeals reversed the lower court and remanded for a de-
termination as to the existence of good cause to keep the case in South
Carolina.
227
The court in Coleman listed the following four factors as poten-
tially "constitut[ing] 'good cause' for the family court to retain juris-
diction": (1) the biological father of the two older girls may have been
unavailable; (2) none of the girls had had any contact with the tribe;
(3) the material witnesses and evidence were in South Carolina; and (4)
removal of the children would have been disruptive, and thus detri-
mental to their best interests.22s The court apparently considered these
particular factors based on its reading of federal guidelines interpreting
the ICWA, 220 authority from other jurisdictions addressing similar is-
sues, 230 and the legislative history of the Act.
2 3 1
The New Mexico Court of Appeals in In re Wayne R.N.232 recog-
nized that the legislative history of the ICWA states that section
1911(b) was designed to "'permit a state court to apply a modified
doctrine of forum non conveniens, in appropriate cases, to insure that
the rights of the child as an Indian, the Indian parents or custodian,
and the tribe are fully protected.' "233 The doctrine of forum non con-
veniens is modified in that the state courts decide whether the tribal
court is inconvenient instead of refusing to exercise jurisdiction be-
cause the state court is inconvenient. Furthermore, the state court con-
siders not only the rights of the parent or custodian, but also the rights
226. Id. at 357, 372 S.E.2d at 914.
227. Id. at 359, 372 S.E.2d at 915.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 358, 372 S.E.2d at 914 (citing Guidelines for State Courts; Indian
Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,583, 67,591 (1979) (not to be codified)).
230. See id. at 358-59, 372 S.E.2d at 914-15 (citing In re Appeal in Pima County,
130 Ariz. 202, 635 P.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied sub nom., Catholic Social Servs.
v. P.C., 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d 311 (Iowa 1984)).
231. See id. at 358, 372 S.E.2d at 914 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 21, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7530, 7544).
232. 107 N.M. 341, 757 P.2d 1333 (Ct. App. 1988).
233. Id. at 344, 757 P.2d at 1337 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
21, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7530, 7544). The court also stated:
In determining whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be
invoked, the trial court should consider the practical factors that make trial of
a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive, such as the relative ease of access to
sources of proof, the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses, and the ability
to secure the attendance of witnesses through compulsory process.
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of the Indian child and tribe in deciding the most convenient forum.234
The court of appeals in Coleman apparently sought to emphasize
the importance of the modified forum non conveniens doctrine. Not
6nly did it stress that the doctrine has been utilized in other cases and
expressly provided for in federal guidelines, but it also recognized that
no witnesses or evidence would be available in South Dakota.2 35 The
distant location of the tribal court, however, generally will not be dis-
positive in and of itself. Rather, accessibility to proof seems to be the
main consideration in a state court's decision to retain jurisdiction.
23
Geographical limitations, therefore, are considered in conjunction with
the location of evidence in determining proper jurisdiction. The court
in In re J.R.H.237 articulated the accessibility to evidence concern,
stating:
Good cause to deny transfer of the proceedings to the tribal court may
arise from geographical obstacles. In determining good cause, we may
consider the circumstances when the "evidence necessary to decide
the case could not be adequately presented in the tribal court without
undue hardship of the parties or the witnesses."
238
Other factors also are taken into account in a court's decision to
deny transfer to a tribal court. For instance, in Coleman the court em-
phasized that transfer might not be proper because of the detrimental
impact on the children. 39 Other courts similarly have held that the
best interests of the child may prevent transfer to another
jurisdiction.
240
An additional factor, which was not considered by the court in
Coleman, is the presence of tribal representatives to advocate a tribe's
position in the child placement proceeding. The New Mexico Court of
Appeals in In re Wayne R.N.241 upheld a family court's determination
of good cause, but considered in its determination testimony offered by
tribal representatives. 242 After finding that the tribes in that case had
waited too long to request a transfer and that the most convenient fo-
rum existed in the state court system, the court concluded that the
234. See Note, supra note 222, at 1142.
235. See Coleman, 296 S.C. at 358-59, 372 S.E.2d at 915.
236. See In re Appeal in Pima County, 130 Ariz. 202, 206, 635 P.2d 187, 191 (Ct.
App. 1981), cert. denied sub nom., Catholic Social Servs. v. P.C., 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
237. 358 N.W.2d 311 (Iowa 1984).
238. Id. at 317 (quoting Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceed-
ings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,583, 67,591 (1979)).
239. Coleman, 296 S.C. at 359, 372 S.E.2d at 915.
240. See, e.g., In re M.E.M., 195 Mont. 329, 635 P.2d 1313 (1981); In re N.L., 754
P.2d 863, 869 (Okla. 1988).
241. 107 N.M. 341, 757 P.2d 1333 (Ct. App. 1988).
242. See id. at 344, 757 P.2d at 1336.
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family court was justified in retaining jurisdiction. Noting its consider-
ation of the testimony offered by representatives of the tribes, the
court stated:
[T]he Tribes had representatives present at the hearing who were in a
position to protect and advance their interests in the proceedings. The
Tribes' attorney stated the Tribes were opposed to the transfer. The
Tribes' social worker could and did testify concerning child rearing
practices of the Tribes. The presence. . . of these representatives...
minimized the danger that the respondent's rights would be termi-
nated on the basis of conduct that would have been acceptable to the
Tribes, or that the Tribes' rights would be overlooked or impaired
during the proceedings.
243
Congress enacted the ICWA to stop abuses by administrative bod-
ies that wrongfully separate Indian children from their families
"through a failure to recognize and appreciate the essential tribal rela-
tions of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing
in Indian communities and families. '244 When tribes are allowed to
present their concerns and explain their family standards, however,
transfer is not warranted if other factors provide good cause to keep
the suit in state court. Although the court of appeals in Coleman left
the determination of good cause to the family court, it outlined factors
which must be considered when determining if transfer to a tribal
court is advisable. It also held that the burden of proving the existence
of good cause is on the party opposing transfer.24 5 In a situation such
as Coleman, in which the family has had little contact with a tribe, it is
even more important to scrutinize the facts of the case to determine if
a state court is the more suitable forum.
If good cause is found to support a family court's exercise of juris-
diction, that determination does not erode the importance of the trans-
fer provision in the ICWA. Congress enacted the ICWA to protect the
best interests of Indian children and tribes. If Indian children are dis-
placed from their natural environments and the costs of litigation pre-
vent some parties or witnesses from participating, as long as the tribes
are represented adequately it rarely can be contended that transfer to
a tribal court is in the best interests of the children or the tribe. The
Coleman decision takes these factors into account and provides guide-
lines for future South Carolina cases in which proper placement of In-
243. Id.
244. In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 111 N.J. 155, 166, 543 A.2d 925,
930 (1988).
245. Coleman, 296 S.C. at 358, 372 S.E.2d at 914.
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